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1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.
This case arises from a buyer's breach of a real estate contract for the sale/purchase of

residential real estate located in Eagle, Idaho. The sole question raised by the case is whether a
seller who has accepted non-refundable earnest money from a buyer pursuant to an agreement
memorialized in a standard form RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE
AGREEMENT and several subsequent RE-11 ADDENDA still has the option of pursuing other
remedies to collect its actual damages after it has accepted non-refundable earnest money.
Paragraph 28 of the RE-21 signed by the parties in this case included the following
language: "DEFAULT: If BUYER defaults in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER shall
have the option of: (1) accepting the earnest money as liquidated damages or (2) or pursuing any
other lawful remedy to which SELLER may be entitled." None of the remaining language in that
Paragraph (Ex. 2A, p. 5) contemplates or addresses a situation where earnest money is made nonrefundable and paid to the seller without conditions before the designated closing date. Rather,
the remaining language in Paragraph 28 addresses situations where earnest money is deposited
with a real estate broker and is still being held by the broker at the time of the buyer's default.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found, and held, that by
accepting the non-refundable earnest money the seller had effectively "pre-elected" the remedy of
acceptance ofliquidated damages and was barred from recovering its actual, substantially greater,
damages (R. p. 150-151). It is the plaintiff's position that the clear language of paragraph 28,
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gave it the option of either accepting the non-refundable earnest money it had received as
liquidated damages or, giving the buyer full credit for the non-refundable earnest money,
instituting an action to recover its actual damages.

B.

Course of the Proceedings.
Plaintiff filed its complaint to recover damages caused by defendant's breach of contract

in District Court in Ada County on November 6, 2013. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
July 28, 2014 and defendant filed his Answer on September 9, 2014. Both parties demanded trial
by jury. The case was eventually tried without a jury, by stipulation of the parties, on September
1, 2015. The Court entered its Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law on September 15, 2015
(R. Vol. 1, p. 142-153) and its judgment on September 24, 2015. Plaintiff filed its Notice of
Appeal on October 30, 2015 and the case was assigned Docket #43678. After the matter was
briefed and scheduled for oral argument, this Court concluded that the judgment entered on
September 24, 2015 was not an appealable final judgment and entered an ORDER
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL on August 16, 2016 (R. Vol. 1, p.179). Appellant
filed a motion with the District Court requesting entry of a judgment amended accordingly. The
District Court did not "re-enter" its amended final judgment until August 31, 2016 (R. Vol. 1,
p.171) and the original appeal was dismissed without prejudice on October 6, 2016 (R. Vol. 1,
p.179). Appellant filed its second Notice of Appeal on October 7, 2016 and, pursuant to this
Court's November 9, 2016 Order Augmenting Prior Appeal (R. Vol. 1, p.167), this matter is
before the Court again.

C.

Statement of Facts
Plaintiff, Todd J. Phillips, is the duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of
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Edward G. Elliott and Trustee of a Trust "A" of the Elliott Family Trust, for which he has acted
in this matter. On the death of Mr. Elliott on March 5, 2008, ownership of the real property
(located at 1372 W. Wickshire Ct, Eagle, Idaho) which is at the heart of this case passed from
Mr. Elliott to Trust "A" of the Elliott Family Testamentary Trust. That transfer was accomplished
on or about the 10th day of April, 2008 (Tr. Pp. 82-83). Phillips, in his capacity as Personal
Representative of the estate of Edward G. Elliott and Trustee of the Elliott Family Trusts, needed
to liquidate the assets of the said Trust in order to distribute Mr. Elliott's estate to his heirs as he
had directed by his last will and testament and listed the said property for sale with an Ada
County Realtor in September of 2008 for the price of $915,000.00 (Tr. p. 84-85). The defendant,
Richard Gomez, contacted the plaintiff in October of2008 through the Trust's Realtor and began
negotiating for the purchase of the property. Those negotiations resulted in an October 28, 2008
agreement between Phillips and Gomez for Gomez to purchase the subject property for
$660,000.00, with the sale to close on December 15, 2009. (Tr. p. 85-87). As consideration for
the agreement, Gomez agreed to make a $66,000.00 down payment as "earnest money", which
sum would become non-refundable and be paid to the Trust on satisfaction of an inspection
contingency. Gomez waived the inspection contingency and the down payment was released to
the Trust in November of 2008 (Tr. p. 22-23). The purchase agreement, which was made on a
standard, pre-printed Idaho real estate form RE-21 (Ex.2A) and several RE-11 forms (with
various addenda and supplemental agreements, also entered into evidence at the trial of this
matter), provided that the closing on the purchase and sale would not take place until December
15, 2009 and that the defendant would lease the premises in the interim. (Ex. 2B, 2F). A lease
agreement (Ex.2G) was executed by the parties and Gomez immediately occupied the premises
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as a tenant, with Phillips expecting the transaction to close on December 15, 2009 (Tr. p. 86).
Around December 1, 2009, Gomez advised Phillips through their Realtor that he would not be
able to get a loan and began trying to negotiate a new agreement. (See Tr. p 86-87). Those
negotiations resulted in an amendment to the agreement, dated December 2, 2009, by which
Phillips agreed to carry a $100,000.00 note from Gomez, with closing still set for December 15,
2009 Ex. 21 and Tr. p 87-89). On December 14, 2009, Gomez advised the Realtor, who in tum
advised Phillips, that he would not close on the property on December 15, 2009 as previously
agreed (Tr. p. 102-104).
After defaulting on the contract, Gomez asked of Phillips that he be allowed to continue
to live in the subject residence as a "month to month" tenant until Phillips should be able to sell
the property. Phillips agreed. (Tr. p. 122-123 and Ex. 2G) and Gomez continued to live in the
residence until May 31, 2010.
After Gomez defaulted on his agreement to close on December 15, 2009, Phillips had the
property re-appraised and listed for sale with a different Realtor (Tr. p. 96-98. Ex. 5). The
property sold to a third party in June of 2009 for $527,500.00, with a net to seller of $503,620.50
(Tr. p. 97-98. Ex. 10-11).

2.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err when it found Phillips' acceptance of non-refundable earnest

money from Gomez constituted an election of remedies which precluded him from pursuing a
claim against Gomez for the damages the Trust actually suffered because of Gomez's breach?
B. Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal, pursuant to
I.C.§ 12-120(3), 12-121 and I.AR. 35(b)(5), I.A.R. 40 and I.AR. 41(a).
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3.
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
"When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are
questions oflaw. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. The purpose of
interpreting a contract is determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract
was entered. In determining the intent of the parties this Court must view the contract as a
whole." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-86, 75 P.3d 743, 746-47 (2003). Bakker
v. Thunderspring-Wareha,n, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 188-89, i08 P. 3d 332,337 (2005).
When reviewing a trial court's decision following a bench trial this Court's review is limited to
determining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law. This Court will exercise free review of a trial court's conclusions
of law to determine whether the court correctly understood and stated applicable law and whether
the trial court's legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho
228,232,280 P.3d 731, 735 (2012) (quoting Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 70607, 52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002)).
4.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY
The plaintiff has been unable to find any case, in Idaho or elsewhere, involving a real
estate transaction where a seller sued a buyer who had made a payment of non-refundable earnest
money before defaulting on the underlying contract, thereby causing the seller to sustain damages
substantially in excess of the earnest money it had received prior to the time buyer defaulted on
the contract. However, plaintiff believes the language in paragraph 28 of the RE-21 (Ex.2A)
executed by the parties specifically allowed it to pursue a claim for its actual additional damages
over and above the amount of the earnest money it received prior to buyer's breach of the
agreement and failure to close on the transaction.
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As noted above, the RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
signed by the parties in this case included the following language: "DEFAULT: If BUYER
defaults in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER shall have the option of: ( 1) accepting
the earnest money as liquidated damages or (2) or pursuing any other lawful remedy to which
SELLER may be entitled". (Ex. 2A, p. 5). The remaining language in that paragraph discusses
only the procedure to be followed in cases where the earnest money paid by a seller is held in a
trust account by a real estate broker and the seller elects to accept that earnest money as its
liquidated damages and makes a demand for its release. There is no language there, or anywhere
else in the RE-21 agreement, or in the RE-11 addenda executed by the parties, addressing a
situation, like this one, where earnest money is released by a buyer and dispersed to a seller long
before a contemplated closing (13 months before, in this case). Nor is there any language
anywhere in the agreement between the parties suggesting the seller here had conceded or given
up its right to make an election to accept earnest money as liquidated damages, seek specific
performance or seek to recover its actual damages. In fact, here Phillips had made it clear from
the time Gomez defaulted that he did not intend to accept the earnest money he had received as
liquidated damages and did intend to pursue either the remedy of specific performance or the
recovery of his actual damages. (See paragraph 4 of plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4), a "Memorandum
of Understanding Re: Terms of Month to Month Lease", signed by Gomez and Phillips on
January 29,2010, after Gomez defaulted, which reads, in part:
"Lessor entered into an agreement to purchase the above referenced premises and was unable to
close that sale, as contemplated by both the original lease and the Purchase and Sale Agreement
between the parties and Lessee understands and acknowledges that he has no further rights
regarding the purchase of these premises, pursuant to the said lease, Purchase and Sale
Agreement or otherwise, and that Lessor, or Todd J. Phillips, acting as Trustee for Lessor, may
bring an action for specific performance and/or damages which have resulted or may result, from
Lessee's failure to have purchased the said premises on the terms he previously agreed to."
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By this language, included in the memorandum of understanding he signed on January 29, 2010
(Tr. p. 61-62), so he could continue to occupy the subject residence, Gomez was put on notice
Phillips did not necessarily intend to accept the earnest money he had received as liquidated
damages. That notice was soon followed by a letter from Phillips' counsel demanding that
Gomez close on the property and advising him that if he did not do so, Phillips would proceed to
sell the house and look to Gomez for any damages the Trust might sustain (Ex, 4, p. 2, paragraph
3, Tr. p. 61-62). There is nothing in the record that would indicate Phillips ever thought about
accepting, much less elected or agreed to accept, the non-refundable earnest money the Trust had
received from Gomez as liquidated damages in lieu of it actual damages.
Gomez did not close on the property and Phillips had the property re-appraised and listed
for sale with a different Realtor. (Tr. p. 96-98. Ex. 5). The property sold to a third party in June of
2009 for $527,500.00, with a net to seller of $503,620.50. (Tr. p. 97-98. Ex. 10-11). Phillips,
who is a licensed Certified Public Accountant, calculated that as a result of the defendant's
breach, the Trust on whose behalf he has acted in this matter incurred actual damages of
approximately $60,000.00 (Tr. p. 110-121. Ex. 15), over and above the earnest money it had
received and filed his complaint in this matter to recover those damages.
Although the case is not directly on point, this Court has previously addressed the issue of
the election of remedies set forth in paragraph 28 of an earlier, but very similar version of the
RE-21 "Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement" used here. In The Margaret H Wayne Trust
v. Allan G. Lipsky 123 Idaho 253, 257-58, 846 P.2nd 906, 908-09 (1993), this Court held that the

presence of a liquidated damage clause in an earnest money agreement does not preclude the
non-defaulting party from recovering its actual damages suffered when the other party breaches
an agreement to purchase real estate and, after a lengthy discussion of the reasons why a seller
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should have the option of pursuing a claim for its actual damages even when it had the option of
accepting earnest money as liquidated damages, concluded that while it might be possible to
clearly draft an agreement that would limit a seller's remedy to retaining an earnest money
deposit as liquidated damages, the language in the standard form real estate contract used in that
case, which is very much like the language in the RE-21 utilized by the parties in this case, did
not prevent the seller from recovering its actual damages. The plaintiff submits that even though
there was no non-refundable earnest money in that case, the same reasoning should apply here.
The conclusion this Court reached in the Wayne case has been cited with approval in
several other jurisdictions and has met with particular approval in Washington and Colorado. In
Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wn. App. 387, 390-91 (Wash. App. Div. 1, 1986), 717 P.2d 285, 288-89

(1986), the Washington Court of Appeals cited Wayne as authority for the proposition that
either/or language of the kind found in the REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE
AGREEMENT signed by the parties in this case would allow a seller to elect to sue for actual
damages rather than accepting earnest money as liquidated damages. It should be noted that this
case did not involve non-refundable earnest money.
In a relatively recent recent case, the Colorado Court of Appeals, Division V, has cited
the Wayne case as authority for its conclusion that a liquidated damages provision in a real estate
contract does not prevent a party from pursuing alternative remedies. See Ravenstar LLC v. One
Ski Hill Place LLC, 012816 COCA, 14 CA 2401 (29-36) (2016). Neither this case, nor any of the

authority it cites involved a case in which non-refundable earnest money was paid by a buyer.
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4.

CONCLUSION
Phillips believes the plain language of Paragraph 28 of the RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE
AND SALE AGREEMENT (Ex. 2A. p. 5) makes it clear he had the option of either retaining the
defendant's non-refundable earnest money as liquidated damages or (emphasis added) pursuing
any other lawful right or remedy to which seller/plaintiff might have been entitled, including
either specific performance or recovery of its actual damages. In this case, Phillips elected to
proceed with an action to recover the Trust's actual damages of approximately $60,000.00 over
and above the amount of the earnest money Gomez released to Phillips. In calculating those
damages, Phillips gave Gomez full credit for his earnest money and asked the trial court to award
the Trust an additional sum of approximately $60,000.00 as and for its actual damages (Tr. p.
110-121. Ex. 15).
Phillips believes that as a matter of law, the trial judge incorrectly construed the language
of paragraph 28 of the RE-21 in ruling that Phillips had "preselected" the Trust's remedy and had
waived or forfeited its right to recover its actual damages by accepting non-refundable earnest
money from Gomez and therefor asks this Court to reverse the decision of the district court, hold
Phillips can recover the Trust's actual damages and remand the case to the trial court for
determination of the exact amount of the damages P}tillips may recover from Gomez.
!

DATED this 4th day of March. 2017.

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of March, 2017, I caused true and correct
copies (2) of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following by
depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid:
STEVEN FISHER
Fisher Law Offices, PLLC
1859 S. Topaz Way, Ste. 200
Meridian, Idaho 83642

DATED this 6h day of March, 2017.
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